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Academic Moneyball

I finally watched Moneyball last night. When I was younger, I spent a lot of time on a baseball field—several years as a catcher, and then a few more as an umpire after I stopped catching pitches. Baseball impacted my life more than any other sport. Which is why I was interested in the theme of Moneyball, but I had no idea how applicable that theme would be to my current work.

I was vaguely familiar with the Billy Beane story when it happened a decade ago. The film helped explain Beane’s popularization of the method by which he used statistical analysis to reduce players to a number and how he subsequently began conducting drafts and trades for the Oakland Athletics based on this metric. Beane made a pretty big splash with this idea that would later come to be known as sabermetrics, named for the Society of American Baseball Research.

Academic MoneyballMoneyball is clearly written and directed to glorify the work Beane did. His character is played by Brad Pitt and he’s depicted as a visionary who revolutionized baseball. It’s easy to get caught up in the story which paints Beane as a supreme underdog battling against teams who have five times the budget of the A’s. Beane is a rogue manager who will do whatever it takes to win. He re-envisions the way players are scouted and contracted in a way that maximizes his disproportional budget. Basically, he wins against all odds. A true American success story. What’s not to love?

Well, the film conveniently glosses over the dark side of Beane’s system of “moneyball.” Players are treated like livestock—traded and cut at a moment’s notice with no regard for the impact it might have on them. In one scene, Beane makes a dozen or so phone calls during which he shifts players around like a kid might trade those players’ baseball cards. But the energy of the scene is manipulated so well that you get caught up in it, pulling for Beane’s success. When he gets what he wants, we’re happy. We share his excitement. It’s easy to forget he’s just uprooted half a dozen families and shipped them across the country. That he’s pulled kids out of schools and hung For Sale signs on a handful of homes. Instead, we see Beane as a hero. He’s slaying the giants and winning with a terrible hand. As Beane so aptly puts it, “We are card counters at the blackjack table and we’re going to turn the odds at the casino.”

Beane’s perfidy is further masked by the two trades we actually witness, wherein both players quietly acquiesce and accept their fates without even a question. “Oh, the players are fine with it,” we’re left to assume. This style of treating people like property has no losers. Everyone wins and no one really gets hurt. I admit I got caught up in the story and I was pulling for Beane. I was hoping players would gracefully accept their fates and not give the hero too much trouble.

The more I thought about it, though, the more I realized Beane isn’t really the victim, nor is he the true underdog. The film fails to recognize that Beane is really just part of the problem. The new economy of baseball which has begun to control the game over the last few decades doesn’t really care about the game any more. Maybe it never did–I don’t know–but it has certainly become more clear than ever before. In the film, we’re constantly reminded that the New York Yankees have a $200 million dollar budget and that no other team can compete with their recruiting power. In other words, it’s all about money. Whichever team best manipulates its budget, is the team that “wins.” Towards the end of the film, the Boston Red Sox owner reminds Beane that “one of the luxuries of money is it buys a lot of things, one of which is the ability to disregard what baseball ‘likes.’” Translation: it’s not about the fans or the game. Of course, with that mentality, the players—the people who actually do the work—matter only as much as the dollar value assigned to them. And what about the game itself? How much can the game really matter when all that counts is the money that can be milked from it?

Academic Moneyball in Action

In America, we have a tendency to glorify the individual who takes lemons and makes lemonade, but we never consider how many lemons get squeezed in the process or what happens to them when all their juice is gone. One of the most profound lines in the movie is delivered by a nameless radio show caller who critiques Beane’s methods, saying, “You can’t approach baseball from a statistical ‘bean count’ point of view. It’s won on the field.” This underscores the point that it’s the actual players who ultimately control the success of the sport.

The Moneyball storyline is incredibly relevant to the current status of higher education. Many of our universities are competing against the New York Yankees. I get that. Everyone is facing budgetary imbalances that are unprecedented. Increasing the reliance on contingent labor is a form of “academic moneyball.” Teachers are now assets that can be liquidated at will for the sake of the budget. However, I believe this is a short-term solution that is actually creating a much bigger problem. Once we decide to stop “winning games on the field,” the entire focus of our educational system shifts to one that inevitably leads to self-destruction. Once we start playing moneyball, it can never again be about the game.

  • http://endsofeducation.wordpress.com wcarp2

    The moneyball system is all about short-term rewards. It ignores things like farm teams, player development, even coaching. The Yankees have a lot of money, but they also have a strong system. The thing that the movie really glosses over is that Beane never won a playoff series. Boston might have won a World Series with a similar system, but they also had the money and system in the end.

    You’re right about current trends in higher ed. Look at what’s going on down at U of Virginia. That’s moneyball stuff. The president wanted to build a long-term system. The board wanted “strategic dynamism.” In that concept, labor is only useful for what it can produce in the short term, and it is always contingent on current market trends.

  • Karen Lentz Madison

    Great statement about creating the business model in areas that had been sacred ground.

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  • http://junctrebellion.wordpress.com junctrebellion

    Beautifully written, but very sad. It is really the neo-liberal worldview applied to everything, isn’t it? Objectify and commodify. It matters very little what actually happens in the field, be that the baseball field, the cornfield or the educational field. Profit rules our culture. It is the great American tragedy of our time.

    • http://orderofeducation.com Josh Boldt

      Yes, unfortunately pure Capitalism only goes in one direction—straight up. It looks nice for awhile, but eventually the air gets so thin, no one can breathe.

  • http://gravatar.com/emarsh Erik Marshall (emarsh)

    One of the differences between baseball and higher ed is the sheer amount of money involved. When a player gets traded, sure, it uproots his family, but with 6-7 figure salaries wherever he goes, his life will not be ruined. With educators, the stakes are much higher because the pay is usually below subsistence-level. Oh, and the fact that education should be much more important than sports. That said, I think the moneyball mentality has long been in play in higher ed. The question is how to reverse it.

  • http://twitter.com/nrcamp Nathan Camp (@nrcamp)

    While a general comparison between academic employment and professional baseball is apt, Josh, albeit, as Erik points out, on a different section of the monetary scale (absolute minimum salary for minor league players was 33.7k in 2011; 414k for MLB players), your reading of the “moneyball” concept leaves a lot to be desired. Misunderstanding the core concept then leads you to a number of erroneous conclusions and false dichotomies, and I think the overall fitness of the baseball :: academics analogy is strong enough that these problems are worth clearing up.

    Neither the idea of empirical performance analysis through advanced statistics nor the term “Moneyball” comes from Billy Beane. The first comes primarily for pioneering baseball stats geek Bill James, who started publishing his now-legendary Baseball Abstract/i> series in 1977 and inspired others in SABR to think differently about baseball stats (though that’s still the minority of what SABR does); the second comes from Michael Lewis, who wrote the book of that title. Beane’s innovation was simply the willingness to apply Jamesian analysis to managing the development of an MLB team.

    The behavior pattern of which you’re primarily critical — trading players — has nothing to do with the “moneyball” approach. Players have long been traded willy-nilly (and I’ll explain below why that’s not a bad thing for the players). Moneyball is shorthand for evaluating players based solely upon their measurable performance while simultaneously searching for types of performance that the overall baseball talent market undervalues. Traditional player evaluation (for drafting and development purposes) relied heavily on the mostly subjective analysis of professional scouts. These analyses were built around things that could easily be measured in the field: physical abilities like strength and speed. Batting averages and counting statistics (HR, RBI) were used, albeit with some skepticism (as even traditionalist scouts realized that such things depended a lot on the level of surrounding competition). One of the early insights of Bill James was that RBI was a pretty useless statistic and Batting Average a deceptive one. He pointed out that the single most useful offensive skill for a player was the ability to avoid making outs, which led to the development of On-Base Percentage (OBP), the keystone stat of Moneyball‘s narrative, and the one with which the approach has become mistakenly associated. In hypothesizing that OBP was undervalued by the market, Beane simply shifted the evaluation lens he used to do the General Manager’s job — provide the right mix of players so a team can turn its salary expenditures into the winningest season possible. Moneyball, in other words, is precisely about winning games on the field; it’s just about doing it by valuing employees that other employers did not.

    A word or two about trades: Players have been traded pretty much for ever, though earlier trades tended to be for cash (see “Ruth, George Herman”) and were rare because the Reserve Clause gave teams lifetime control over their players. The primary effect of the Reserve Clause was to keep player salaries incredibly low and owner profits high. The Supreme Court-ordered dissolution of the reserve clause in 1976 ushered in free agency, in which teams were required to bid for the services of players without contracts. Unsurprisingly, salaries went up. Also unsurprisingly, MLB and the Players’ Union continued to negotiate a series of CBAs to formalize the free agent structure. Minimum salaries were put in place to protect players; six years of team control prior to free agency were put in place to protect the teams’ investments in drafting and developing young players (a very unpredictable process). Trading grew steadily along with free agency, as the complex calculus between contract cost, length, and performance led all teams to seek to get the best value from their increasingly expensive mix of players. Large-market teams (the Yankees are always at the top of this list) tend to sign expensive, established free agents and trade young prospects for good players under contract to another club. Small-market teams tend to extract maximum trade value from free-agents-to-be whose new contracts they think will be unaffordable, gaining several young players who may provide the same value for less money; Tampa Bay and Milwaukee have had consistent recent success using this model.

    This slow-mo explosion in free agency and trade frequency over the past 35 years have had one central result: players getting paid. The inflation-adjusted (2010 dollars) average salary for a 1975 player was roughly 179k — well under half the current MLB minimum wage. The average salary in 2010, however, was over 3.3M. The players’ share of overall revenues has also grown tremendously. I can’t find figures for pre-1976 percentages, but player contracts currently account for 60% of baseball revenue. Even 15 years ago, that number might have been 50%. My guess is that the Reserve Clause era numbers were well under 40%. So trades profit players in the long run. The immediate displacement impact of trades is also mitigated by the CBA, which provides up-front payments to traded players to defray immediate costs of relocation, plus eventual reimbursement of moving expenses and in-season property rental. Just to illustrate the difference in economic stratum, the current CBA says that traded or assigned players will be reimbursed for “the reasonable and actual moving expenses of the player and the player’s immediate family,” hastening to add that said expenses include first-class airfare for the whole family. Players (even minor league players) cut in the middle of the season also receive their entire salary. This doesn’t add up to the affective vignette you’ve painted.

    And I guess that brings me back to the baseball :: academics analogy, which now leaves baseball looking somewhat aspirational as a comparison. Both systems admit more low-wage employees than can reach the brass ring of full-time stable employment (minor leaguers :: grad students?). Both suffer from a glut of starry-eyed youngsters who ignore the aforementioned weedout structure. Both get a lot of national press, especially when a high-paid employee gets arrested. But baseball has a national salary structure (admittedly one that leaves most of its minor league players making near-adjunct-level wages). It provides benefits and severance pay in case of mid-contract termination. The whole system is developmental (so it’s designed to make as many employees as possible into higher-paid employees). It has relocation reimbursement built in. It’s a testament to the power of collective bargaining in a pyramidal labor market. And none of that stuff has anything to do with Moneyball.

    • http://orderofeducation.com Josh Boldt

      Oh, okay. Thanks for your input.

  • Currer Bell

    Just found your blog, thanks to mamanervosa and your comment. I really enjoyed reading this post, so I’ll apologize in advance that your post reminded me a ridiculous amount of that movie with the South Park guys, Baseketball. The whole player trading, inflated salaries, etc…

    I’ll try and come up with a more scholarly comment in future :)

    Currer Bell
    http://projectreinvention2012.blogspot.com

    • http://orderofeducation.com Josh Boldt

      Ha. I don’t mind the comparison. Thanks for reading.

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